The Board of Education of the Alpine School District v. Property Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
The Board of Education of the Alpine School
District v. Property Tax Division of the Utah State
Tax Commission : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Timothy A. Bodily; assistant attorney general; Jan Graham; attorney general; counsel for respondent.
Brinton R. Burbidge, Paul D. Van Komen; Burbidge, Carnahan, Ostler, White; counsel for petitioner.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Board of Education v. Tax Commission, No. 20000109 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2618
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
THE ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
PROPERTY TAX DIVISION OF 
THE UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
No. 20000109-CA 
Priority No. 14 
Appeal from a Final Decision of the Utah State Tax Commission 
Brinton R. Burbidge (0491) 
Paul D. Van Komen (7332) 
BURBIDGE, CARNAHAN, OSTLER 
& WHITE 
50 South Main Street, #1400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Counsel for Petitioner 
Timothy A. Bodily 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Jan Graham 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 140874 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117-0874 
Counsel for Respondent 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
AUG ? * 20C3 
PautetteStagg 
Cterk of the Court 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THI sT VI» OF UTAH 
THE BOARD o r EDUCATION OF 
THE ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
PROPER! \ I AA DiVISi. 
THE UTAH SI AIT TAX 
COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
No. 20000109-CA 
Priority No II 
Appeal from a I''ma I Decision ol the Utah Slate I a\ Commission 
iii i.Hon K lUirbidgc (0491) 
Paul I) Van komen(7332) 
lit :Rmi)GI-:. CARNA! IAN, OSTLER 
& WHITE 
^0 South Main Sireet. fM400 
Sail Lake Citv, UT 84 14^ 
Timothy A. Bod.il>' 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Jan. Graham 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 
P.O.Box 140874 
Salt Lake City, Uuu M4 i : 
Counsel for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
I. REPLY 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE COMMISSION LACKED AUTHORITY TO 
LOWER ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT'S PROPERLY ADOPTED 
RATE 1 
A. PROPER STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
DEMONSTRATES THAT THE COMMISSION HAS NO 
AUTHORITY TO LOWER ALPINE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT'S ADOPTED TAX RATE 3 
1. The Commission Cannot Effectively Respond to the 
Plain and Unambiguous Statutory Language Which 
Demonstrates That the Commission Exceed its 
Authority 3 
2. The Commission Erroneously Attempts to Inject its 
Own Interpretation of the Legislative Intent 5 
B. ONCE ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT ADOPTED ITS TAX 
RATE IN EXCESS OF THE CERTIFIED TAX RATE, THE 
COMMISSION HAD NO AUTHORITY TO CHANGE 
THAT ADOPTED TAX RATE 6 
1. The Statutory Framework Allows a Taxing Entity like 
Alpine District to Adopt a Rate Which Exceeds the 
Certified Tax Rate 6 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924(2)(G) Does Not Support 
the Commission's Action, Despite the Commission's 
Reliance upon It 7 
3. Alpine School District Satisfied the Requirements of 
Truth in Taxation in Adopting its Tax Rate 10 
C. THE COMMISSION DOES NOT HAVE A BROAD 
GRANT OF DISCRETION TO IGNORE THAT UNDER 
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK, IT HAD NO 
AUTHORITY TO LOWER THE ADOPTED RATE 14 
II. CONCLUSION 15 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 916 ['.2d 344 (Utah 1996) 3 
Biddle v. Washburn Terrace City. 1999 U 1 110, y93 P.2d 875 4 
C.T. ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1^99 I : I 3<r u 7 7 P M \" '» 
County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 
944 P.2d 370 (Ut;»1< 1>y'-^ 5 
K
-"': .'' .'Ac ( 7///W (V ,'amily l/ieraj:, c . . . /-><v/, ,,.- £. 
890 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1995) u 
State v. Valdez, 933 P.2d 400 (Utah Ct. App . 1997) 6 
Utah State Bar v Summerhaycs & Harden. C f K TV.'ii }<(• -. I !..;. . -95) 7 
Service Division, Utah Slate Tax Comm 'n, 930 P.2d i iyb (Utah 1997) 5 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-912 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-919 1, ,, • ., i^, o 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-2-908 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-914 ' ' 1« 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-914(1 )(a) 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924(2)(g) 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15 
I. REPLY 
INTRODUCTION 
THE COMMISSION LACKED AUTHORITY TO LOWER ALPINE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT'S PROPERLY ADOPTED RATE. 
The Commission fails to meet the key issue before this court: whether the 
Commission exceeded its authority in lowering Alpine School District's adopted tax 
rate.1 The Commission mistakenly assumes that the dispute hinges on its authority over 
the certified tax rate. However, the certified tax rate and Alpine School District's 
adopted tax rate are two statutorily different rates. The Commission attempts to divert 
attention from its lack of authority to change adopted tax rates by recharacterizing its 
actions as a rate correction to the certified tax rate instead of a reduction to a properly 
adopted tax rate. However, this matter does not involve a simple a tax rate correction, 
but rather involves an unauthorized reduction to Alpine School District's lawfully 
adopted tax. An analysis of the plain language of the relevant statutory provisions 
demonstrates that once Alpine School District had lawfully adopted its tax rate in excess 
of the certified tax rate and within the maximum levy permitted by law, the Commission 
lacked authority to lower the adopted tax rate. 
In addition, the Commission attempts to obfuscate the issue by pointing to the 
change to its motor vehicle fee-in-lieu revenue estimates. Again, this bypasses the real 
!The Commission continues to refer to Alpine School District's tax rate in excess 
of the certified tax rate as the "proposed tax rate" when pursuant to the statutory 
framework it should properly be referred to as Alpine School District's "adopted tax 
rate." {See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-912, 59-2-919.) 
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issue. This matter arises out of and is centered on Alpine School District's adopted ad 
valorem tax rate. Although the Commission's estimates of motor vehicle fee-in-lieu 
revenue are relevant to the Commission's establishment of the "certified tax rate," the 
Commission's motor vehicle fee-in-lieu revenue estimates—and any adjustment to the 
certified rate—have no bearing or relationship to Alpine School District's adopted tax rate 
in excess of the certified tax rate. Indeed, the statutory framework clearly limits any 
adjustment to any tax rate based on the Commission's motor vehicle fee-in-lieu revenue 
to only the certified tax rate. However, the statutory framework expressly provides that a 
taxing entity like Alpine School District is not bound to the certified tax rate, providing 
the means by which the taxing entity can exceed the certified tax when in setting its ad 
valorem property tax rate. Consequently, the Commission's extended reliance on its own 
untimely, altered motor vehicle fee-in-lieu revenue estimates as the basis for its action in 
reducing Alpine School District's adopted tax rate is misplaced. The issue is not what 
amount of fee-in-lieu revenue from motor vehicles Alpine School District would 
ultimately receive, but whether Alpine School District adopted a rate for ad valorem 
property tax in excess of the certified tax rate. 
A. PROPER STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DEMONSTRATES THAT 
THE COMMISSION HAS NO AUTHORITY TO LOWER ALPINE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT'S ADOPTED TAX RATE. 
1. The Commission Cannot Effectively Respond to the Plain and 
Unambiguous Statutory Language Which Demonstrates That the 
Commission Exceeded its Authority. 
Proper principles of statutory construction and interpretation demonstrate that the 
Commission exceeded its authority in reducing Alpine's adopted rate. The 
Commission's claim that Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924(2)(g) independently grants it 
authority to reduce Alpine's adopted rate misreads the plain language of the statute. That 
language itself evidences only the intent to grant the Commission authority to adjust the 
certified tax rate. Rather than recognizing that the plain statutory language offers no 
valid basis for its action, the Commission erroneously injects the claim that it acted to 
effect the legislative intent. The Commission would thus substitute its own interpretation 
of intent which is in contravention to the language of the statutes. This legislative intent 
argument, however, fails to account for the basic tenet that "The best indicator of 
[legislative] intent is the plain language of the statute." Beaver County v. Utah State Tax 
Comm 'w, 916 P.2d 344, 358 (Utah 1996). In fact, the plain language of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-2-924(2)(g) allows the Commission to adjust only the certified tax rate, which is a 
statutorily defined term. Though the Commission erroneously attempts to construe its 
action as simply lowering the certified tax rate, the Commission did not simply lower 
certified tax rates but rather lowered Alpine School District's adopted tax rate. 
Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924(2)(g) provides: 
-3-
For the calendar year beginning on January 1, 1999, and 
ending on December 31, 1999, a taxing entity's certified 
tax rate shall be adjusted by the amount necessary to offset 
the adjustment in revenues from uniform fees on tangible 
personal property under Section 59-2-405.1 as a result of the 
adjustment in uniform fees on tangible personal property 
under Section 59-2-405.1 enacted by the Legislature during 
the 1998 Annual General Session. 
Despite the clarity of the limited grant of authority provided by the legislature in this 
subsection, the Commission simply disregards the plain language of the statute, claiming 
that Section 924(2)(g) provides a broad and expansive grant of authority under which it 
is authorized to change Alpine School District's adopted rate. 
In addition, the Commission ignores the context in which Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-
924(2)(g) is found. Subsection 924(2)(g) is a subset of the statute which deals only with 
the certified tax rate. Had the legislature desired to grant broad authority to change rates 
in addition to the "certified tax rate" as asserted by the Commission, it certainly would 
not have limited the grant by only using the defined term "certified tax rate." The Utah 
Supreme Court has held: 
This court looks first to the plain language of a statute when 
deciding questions of statutory interpretation and assumes 
that each term was used advisedly by the legislature. 
Similarly, statutory construction presumes that the expression 
of one should be interpreted as the exclusion of another. 
Therefore, omissions in statutory language should "be taken 
note of and given effect." 
Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110,\\4, 993 P.2d 875 (citations omitted). 
Further, in construing a statute, a court must assume that "each term in the statute 
was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable." County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County v. 
Utah State Tax Comm 7z, 944 P.2d 370, 373 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). Had the 
legislature desired to empower the Commission to lower a taxing entity's adopted rate, it 
could have expressly done so. The absence of any such grant of authority or any 
reference to such notion in the statute itself demonstrates that the grant of authority is 
limited and that the Commission inappropriately acted beyond its authority. 
2. The Commission Erroneously Attempts to Inject its Own 
Interpretation of the Legislative Intent. 
Rather than looking to the statutory language, the Commission seeks instead to 
rely on selected statements made by two legislators. (Respondent's Brief at 11, 14.) 
Although neither legislative actually supports the Commission's overly broad 
interpretation of the statute, the Commission's reference to the statements is nevertheless 
unwarranted. Because the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, any reference to 
legislative history is unnecessary and inappropriate. Of interest is the position advanced 
by the Commission in the case of Visitor Information Center Authority of Grand County 
v. Customer Service Division, Utah State Tax Comm yn, 930 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1997). 
The Commission urged the Utah Supreme Court to agreed with its position that "that the 
language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and, thus, any inquiry into legislative 
history would be improper." Id. at 1197. The court held: 
Unless the statute on its face is unclear or ambiguous, we find 
no need to delve into the uncertain facts of legislative history. 
"When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to 
mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction." 
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Id at 1198 {citing Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 
1017, 1020 (Utah 1995)); accord State v. Valdez, 933 P.2d 400, 401 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) ("[0]nly if the plain language of the statute is unclear do we 'resort to legislative 
history and purpose for guidance.'" (citation omitted)). It is understandable that the 
Commission wants no part of this holding in the case at bar. Because the statutory 
language is clear, "both the legislative history and statements made by Senator[s] must 
yield to the clear and unmistakable language of the statute." C T ex rel Taylor v. 
Johnson, 1999 UT 35, ^ 13, 977 P.2d 479. 
Thus, the Commission's repeated references to the assumed intent that the 
commission adjust all tax rates to avoid "windfalls" is based entirely on two comments 
made by the legislatures, and has no basis in the statute itself. In any case, any 
statutory intent that the Commission adjust tax rates to prevent windfalls would be 
further limited by the statute's plain language to the context of establishing the certified 
tax rate. 
B. ONCE ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT ADOPTED ITS TAX RATE IN 
EXCESS OF THE CERTIFIED TAX RATE, THE COMMISSION HAD NO 
AUTHORITY TO CHANGE THAT ADOPTED TAX RATE. 
1. The Statutory Framework Allows a Taxing Entity like Alpine District 
to Adopt a Rate Which Exceeds the Certified Tax Rate. 
The Commission correctly states that "A taxing entity is permitted to annually 
issue a levy for ad valorem property tax upon the property located within its jurisdiction." 
(Respondent's Brief at 8-9.) However, the Commission's next statement that "This levy 
is limited by law to the 'certified rate.'" (Respondent's Brief at 9), is misleading and 
incorrect. The Commission actually admits that the that the levy is not limited to the 
"certified tax rate," stating, "A taxing entity is prohibited from budgeting ad valorem 
revenue in excess of the revenue allowed under the certified rate unless it properly 
completes the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-918 and 919." (Respondent's 
Brief at 9.) The statutory scheme provides that the taxing entity may exceed the certified 
tax rate once it satisfies certain procedural and public notice requirements known as a 
"truth in taxation" hearing. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924(2)(G) Does Not Support the Commission's 
Action, Despite the Commission's Reliance upon It. 
While the plain statutory language allows the Commission to adjust the certified 
tax rate, it does not allow the Commission to subsequently change the adopted rate of 
Alpine School District. The Commission makes the unsupported logical leap that 
"Because the Commission was required to adjust Alpine's certified rates, it was also 
required to adjust the proposed rates." (Respondent's Brief at 12.) The certified tax rate 
and Alpine's adopted rate are two separately defined terms. 
"[W]ords and phrases used in a statute, if also defined by statute, must be 
construed according to that definition." Utah State Bar v. Summerhayes & Hayden, 905 
P.2d 867, 871 (Utah 1995). "Certified tax rate" is statutorily defined as follows: "The 
'certified tax rate' means a tax rate that will provide the same ad valorem property tax 
revenues for a taxing entity as were collected by that taxing entity for the prior year." 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924(2)(a)(i). The term "Adopted tax rate" is specifically 
referenced in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924, and means "a tax rate in excess of the certified 
tax rate" adopted by resolution. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-919. Once Alpine School 
District adopts a rate in excess of the certified tax rate pursuant to the requirements of 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-919, any reference to the "certified tax rate" becomes irrelevant 
because the proper term as used in the statutory framework is the "adopted tax rate." 
Relying on Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924(2)(g), the Commission asserts that 
"Because the Commission had authority to reduce Alpine's certified rate, the 
Commission also had authority to reduce Alpine's proposed rate in order to give effect to 
the plain language of the statute and its legislative intent." (Respondent's Brief at 6). 
However, this statement is internally inconsistent. It is simply fallacious to assume that 
because the Commission is authorized at the outset to make an adjustment to the certified 
tax rate based on its estimates for motor vehicle fee-in-lieu revenue, the Commission is 
also authorized to subsequently adjust a taxing entity's adopted rate. Alpine School 
District's adopted rate has no direct relation to the certified rate nor to the Commission's 
estimates of motor vehicle fee-in-lieu revenue. The Commission simply ignores the 
statutory framework, characterizing Alpine School District's statutorily defined approved 
rate as merely a "proposed rate." The Commission's reasoning ignores the legislature's 
express authorization to taxing entities such as Alpine School District to adopt a different 
rate which exceeds the certified tax rate. 
The Commission's argument makes certain assumptions which are simply 
incorrect. The Commission assumes that Alpine arrives at its proposed and adopted rate 
primarily based on the certified rate and that the adopted rate remains dependent upon the 
certified rate, asserting that "Because the certified rate is the key component of the 
proposed rate, lowering one necessarily involves lowering the other in order to give the 
statute effect." (Respondent's Brief at 13.) This is simply wrong. Again, the adopted 
rate is independent from the certified rate. When Alpine determines that the certified rate 
is insufficient, Alpine has the statutory option to exceed the certified rate to establish the 
ad valorem rate it deems necessary, provided it does not exceed the maximum levy set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 53-2-908. Thus, in arriving at the adopted rate, the central 
issue is what ad valorem tax rate Alpine School District desires to set, a determination 
which includes rate-setting considerations essential in order to receive guaranteed or 
additional funds apart from the funds raised directly from the ad valorem tax. (R. 71 at 
pp. 8-9.) The key consideration is not simply the certified rate. The fact that the certified 
tax rate may be subsequently lowered or increased does not alter the fact that the ad 
valorem tax rate adopted by Alpine School District is no longer dependent upon or 
related to the certified tax rate. The Commission's Brief ignores the evidence presented 
to the Commission below that Alpine School District set its budget and ad valorem tax 
rate independently, based on its own estimates. (R. 71 at pp. 8-9.) 
In addition, the Commission's reasoning erroneously assumes that District is privy 
to the Commission's fee-in-lieu estimates. This assumption is simply contrary to all the 
evidence presented below. (R. 71 at pp. 8-9.) Because Alpine School District is left to 
rely on its own estimates, it is essential that Alpine School District be able to set its 
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budget based those estimates. The Commission's fee-in-lieu estimates are only relevant 
for purposes of the Commission's determination of the certified tax rate. Fee-in-lieu 
estimates are not relevant to Alpine School District's adopted rate. 
Also inherent in the Commission's argument is the flawed notion that the 
individual taxing entity is precluded from making its own estimates of tax revenue.2 This 
assumes that the individual taxing entity must be bound by the estimates generated by 
the Commission. However, if such were the case, the legislature would not have 
provided the individual taxing entity with the ability to exceed the certified tax rate. In 
fact, an individual taxing entity is empowered to determine its budgetary needs, set a 
budget, and determine the amount of ad valorem taxes it will levy. 
3. Alpine School District Satisfied the Requirements of Truth in Taxation 
in Adopting its Tax Rate. 
After a local taxing entity like Alpine School District has gone through the truth in 
taxation proceedings, a taxing entity can exceed the certified tax rate as long as it does 
not exceed the maximum levy allowed by law. In other words, once truth in taxation 
proceedings are satisfied, an adopted tax rate cannot be changed by the Commission 
unless the adopted tax rate exceeds the maximum levy allowed by law. Apparently 
2In footnote 2 of its Brief, the Commission raises an issue which is entirely beside 
the point, stating that Alpine's necessary practice of having to make its own estimates of 
fee-in-lieu revenue is "in conflict and do[es] not square with the plain meaning of Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-2-924(2)(g) which places with the Commission the authority and 
obligation to estimate fee-in-lieu revenue." Alpine School District has never asserted 
that its fee-in-lieu estimates should be used as official estimates in establishing the 
certified rate. It is disingenuous to assert that the statute somehow prevents taxing 
entities from making their own estimates for their own uses. 
recognizing the weakness of its position in light of its tacit acknowledgment that it 
cannot change a properly adopted tax rate, the Commission now attempts to raises the 
argument, contrary to its own findings, that Alpine did not comply with the requirements 
of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-919. However, the Commission not only waived the 
argument below but in fact and made findings not merely inconsistent with but flatly 
contrary to the position it now espouses. 
Despite its own findings to the contrary, the Commission now would claim that 
"Under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-914, the Commission had authority to lower Alpine's 
rate because it violated the maximum levy permitted by law when it presented incorrect 
information to the taxpayers under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-919." (Respondent's Brief at 
17.) The Commission's own findings from the outset have been that Alpine School 
District lawfully complied with all the requirements to increase its tax rate above the 
certified tax rate as prescribed by Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-919. The original ruling of 
October 12 provided that "Alpine properly completed the statutory tax increase 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-919 that were necessary for it to levy its proposed 
property tax increase." (R. 57.) (emphasis added.) In its final ruling, the Commission 
again found compliance, conceding that it could not lower Alpine's adopted [proposed] 
rate based on Section 919 when it ruled that "Section 59-2-919 does not allow a taxing 
entity to levy a tax rate higher than its certified tax rate unless the procedures found in 
that section are satisfied. Nebo and Alpine did complete those procedures, so neither 
Nebo's nor Alpine's proposed tax rate could be lowered just because its proposed tax 
rate exceeded its recalculated certified tax rate." (R. 33.) (emphasis added.) 
"Instead, the Division lowered Nebo's and Alpine's proposed tax rates to satisfy 
the provisions of subsection 59-2-924(2)(g)." (R. 33.) Thus, as stated by the 
Commission, the Commission based its decision for lowering Alpine School District's 
adopted rate on Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924(2)(g) because it could not rely on Utah 
Code Ann. §59-2-919. 
Any assertion of noncompliance with Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-919 also ignores the 
fact that the Commission's untimely actions precluded Alpine School District from 
holding subsequent truth-in-taxation proceedings.3 The Commission's interpretation 
would impose upon Alpine School District the obligation to hold multiple truth in 
taxation hearings anytime the Commission adjusted the certified tax rate, despite having 
inadequate time under the statutory framework to do so. Previously the Commission 
3Alpine School District was hindered because throughout the entire process, the 
Commission failed to provide information by the dates prescribed by the. As evidenced 
by the deadlines provided for in the statutes by the legislature, the legislature intended 
that the Commission provide accurate and timely certified tax rates to the individual 
taxing entities. However, the Commission failed to provide Alpine with the certified tax 
rate before June 1 as prescribed in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924(1). At best, it is an 
understatement for the Commission to say that "The legislature probably thought the 
certified rates would be lowered before any proposed rates were submitted." 
(Respondent's Brief at 13.) In fact, in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924(1), the legislature 
expressly instructs that certified rates are to be provided by June 1. However, the 
Commission failed to provide Alpine with the certified tax rate before June 1. as 
prescribed. The intent as evidenced by the inclusion of deadlines in the statutes is that 
certified rate would be provided in timely manner so that a taxing entity like Alpine 
School District could exceed the certified tax rate and adopt the ad valorem tax rate it 
deemed necessary. 
recognized this, noting, that "by the time the Division recalculated the certified tax rates, 
most of the steps associated with the final tax rate setting processes had already occurred, 
including the proposal of tax rates by the taxing entities, the receipt of the subsection 59-
2-919(4) notices of valuation by all taxpayers, and the completion of the publication and 
hearing requirements by those taxing entities proposing tax increases." (R. 32-32.) If the 
Commission sought to justify its adjustment of the adopted rate with any deficiency in 
Alpine School District's truth in taxation compliance, it should have informed Alpine so 
that Alpine could have again availed itself of the procedural requirements for truth in 
taxation set forth in Section 919. At the hearing before the Commission, Alpine School 
District specifically raised this point: 
even if it were to determined that the Commission does have 
authority to reduce an entity's proposed tax rate because of a 
revised certified tax rate, then the entity should be given the 
same opportunity it had with the original certified tax rate. 
That is, to review those rates to determine if they want to 
exceed the certified tax rate, and then should be given the 
same opportunity to go through the notice procedure, the 
truth in taxation procedure. 
Now, in this situation it seems a little ridiculous to do that 
because if we were to go through that process, we're going 
back and telling our constituents there that we're having 
another truth in taxation hearing; however, your taxes are not 
going to go up any higher than they did in the last meeting. It 
will be exactly the same as in the last meeting, the only 
difference being that the certified tax rate has changed. 
(R. at 71 pp. 9-10.) 
Further, at the time Alpine provided its notices and held its hearings, the 
information provided to the public was correct. The essential purpose of the truth in 
_n_ 
taxation provisions is to inform taxpayers of the ad valorem tax rate and amount of their 
ad valorem tax. It is to give notice of what tax they will be paying. Taxpayers were in 
fact informed what the actual tax would be. Alpine School District complied by 
informing its taxpayers the amount of ad valorem tax which Alpine School District 
would collect. Inherent in the notice process are safeguards against windfalls as 
concerned citizens are able to assess the information. 
C THE COMMISSION DOES NOT HAVE A BROAD GRANT OF 
DISCRETION TO IGNORE THAT UNDER THE STATUTORY 
FRAMEWORK, IT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO LOWER THE ADOPTED 
RATE, 
The Commission further seeks to justify the substitution of its own statutory 
interpretation by asserting that it has acted within an explicit grant of discretion to 
interpret the statute. In support, the Commission points to the introductory phrase of 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-914(l)(a) which states: "If the commission determines that a levy 
established for a taxing entity set under Section 59-2-913 is in excess of the maximum 
levy permitted by law, the commission shall: (a) lower the levy so that it is set at the 
maximum level permitted by law . . . ." This is not an explicit grant of discretion to 
construe the meaning of the statute, however. This plainly does not grant the 
Commission the discretion to define "the maximum level permitted by law." That term, 
like others, is defined in the statutes. Specifically, the "maximum levy permitted by law'5 
is statutorily defined in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-908 which is entitled "Single aggregate 
limitation-Maximum levy." 
Thus, any grant of discretion to the Commission in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-
914(l)(a) is not general, but is limited to the determination of whether Alpine's adopted 
rate exceed the maximum levy level set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-908. The 
Commission made no finding that Alpine's adopted rate exceed the maximum levy as 
provided for in § 59-2-908, and no further deference is granted to the Commission. 
(Even if the Commission were granted the discretion it claims, its Ruling fails even under 
a reasonableness standard of review.) Certainly, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-914(l)(a) does 
not grant the Commission discretion to broadly disregard the plain language of Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-2-924(2)(g). Once Alpine School District adopted its proposed rate, the 
certified tax rate and adopted rate are not linked except to the extent the certified tax rate 
might be the maximum levy permitted by law as prescribed by 59-2-908. However, the 
Commission has never asserted that in this case the certified tax rate is the maximum. 
Nothing in the statutory framework directly links the adopted rate to the certified rate. 
As a result, subsequent changes made by the Commission to the certified rate do not 
affect the validity of Alpine School District's adopted rate. 
The Commission also alludes to its constitutional authorization to oversee the 
state's taxation. However, this general authority to administer and supervise the tax laws 
of the state does not allow the Commission to defy plain statutory language enacted by 
the Legislature. The Commission's action in contravention to the plain meaning of the 
statutory framework cannot be justified by its role as overseer of taxes. 
-15-
II. CONCLUSION 
The Commission exceeded its authority in ordering that Alpine School District's 
adopted tax rate be reduced. Proper statutory construction of the relevant statutes leads 
directly to the conclusion that the statutes do not authorize this action. Alpine School 
District lawfully complied with all the requirements to impose a tax rate exceeding the 
certified tax rate, and that adopted rate therefore did not exceed the maximum levy 
permitted by law. The Commission erroneously lowered Alpine School District's 
adopted tax rate, in reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924(2)(g). Because the District's 
adopted rate was approved in compliance with truth in taxation requirements, and 
exceeded the certified rate, the Commission's lowering of the certified rate based on its 
changed estimates of fee-in-lieu revenues is irrelevant to the validity of the District's 
adopted rate and cannot provide a basis for altering the adopted rate. 
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